What every control does, what it means for the partnership, and how to set it for a conversation with a family office or an institutional lender who has a facility and wants to build something that lasts.
It is not a pitch deck and it is not a pro forma. It is a mechanism model: it answers one question, which is how an equity partner makes money standing between a frozen market and a venue that does not exist yet.
Everything on the page is a single representative year. Change the inputs and you have a different year. Walk the inputs forward and you have the plan.
The EP's return comes from three places and pays for itself out of two costs. Carry on what it holds, spread when it sells back into the book, interest on advances to other holders — against the facility rate and the commitment fee. If you understand nothing else about the model, understand this: the blended entry yield has to beat the facility rate. That gap is the business. Everything else is scale.
This is an L, and it was built to be one. Year one has almost no float, almost no trading, and a cornerstone obligation that looks like pure cost. That is the runway, and the mechanism exists precisely because someone has to stand there during it. Once BTCglobal reads as a legitimate listing venue for all income-producing property — retail owners, commercial owners, other family offices — supply arrives faster than capital can absorb it, and the model goes from 1 to 10 without changing a single assumption.
The tool shows you both halves honestly. In the flat years it will tell you the exit is thin and you are a holder. In the steep years it will tell you your money runs out before the listings do. Both of those are the plan working.
Listings arriving on the platform per year, on the doubling path. Years 1–3 are the reason the cornerstone commitment has to be contractual rather than hoped for; years 4–6 are why an EP signs it.
This is the partner's balance sheet. Own capital is theirs; the facility is borrowed. Total capital is the sum, and it splits two ways: inventory buys partitions the EP holds and resells, the loan book advances against partitions other holders pledge.
The equity the EP actually commits. Every return on the page is divided by this number, so it is the denominator of the whole conversation.
whatever the partner will actually write. Size it from the obligation, not from a target return — section 4 tells you how much property you are on the hook for.
How much of the line is outstanding. It adds to buying power and it costs the facility rate every day it is out. Roughly two dollars drawn per dollar of equity is a defensible warehouse structure; the bottom bar turns amber past 3x and red past 6x.
about 2x own capital to start.
The most important number on the page. It is the hurdle every other yield is measured against. The blended entry yield in section 2 must clear it, or the EP is paying to own property. It also sets whether the flywheel is accretive and whether the loan book earns a spread.
the partner's real cost of funds. Ask them; do not guess.
The committed line, not the drawn balance. It has to cover the drawn amount plus the flywheel borrowing in section 3, because both come off the same line. If it does not, the panel turns red and says so — no lender funds an overage, and a return that assumes they do is not a return.
enough that Facility in use stays inside it. Watch that tile.
The commitment fee on undrawn headroom. It is the price of optionality, and it is charged on what is left after both the drawn balance and the flywheel — not on the slider alone. This is why an oversized line is not free.
25–50 bps. The default of 37.5 is a fair mid-market assumption.
How total capital divides between buying property and lending against it. The two businesses compete for the same partitions: every dollar of inventory the EP buys shrinks the float available to lend against.
100% in the early years. There is nobody to lend to until other people own a meaningful float. Lending is a year-four business.
Every listing that comes to the platform is bought in two pieces. Pool 1 is the cornerstone: a contractual slice the EP takes at a low yield, which is what lets the seller exit. Pool 2 is whatever the rest of the listing has to pay to clear.
Pool 1 is not where the money is. It is the price of admission. What it buys is a guaranteed right to scarce supply — the one thing capital cannot manufacture in a frozen market — and access to Pool 2, which is where the money is.
The two shares add, and the pair cannot exceed the listing. 35% cornerstone plus 55% open market is 90% of the listing, with 10% reaching everybody else. Raising one lowers the ceiling on the other. The number to watch is not either slider — it is the remainder, which the panel shows as All in, your share of a listing.
One precision that matters when you judge that remainder. These are shares of a listing, not of a building. An owner using this as a refinancing raises part of their equity — if they list 30% of the building and the EP takes 90% of that listing, the EP owns 27% of the real estate and other holders own 3%. Thin, but a different kind of thin from what “90%” sounds like.
The cornerstone right. The yield is guaranteed; the fill is not. Up to 35% of every listing is the EP's to take at the contracted bid, and they can always take less. Taking more drags the blend down, because this slice is bought at a high price.
35% for the term-sheet case, then drop it and watch what happens to the blend.
A contractual standing bid, at issuance only. The EP guarantees to take up to its share of every new listing at this yield, on demand. A low yield is a high price, and that premium is the subsidy that makes a listing clear. The guarantee is the product. An owner can list because an exit is certain to exist, which is the thing no prior venue could promise.
The yield is fixed for the term, and deliberately not indexed to anything outside the venue. The level that moves a frozen owner is a fact about that owner, not a spread over the cost of money. Tie it to the ten-year and at 5.00% you post 5.00% — and the owner who transacts at 4.50% and declines at 5.00% is not served. It would also import exactly the volatility the venue exists to escape.
The EP is protected by bounded exposure instead of a bounded price: a maximum per year, a defined term, and a dislocation clause that fires only on a several-hundred-basis-point move. A price you can move is an option you hold; a quantity you cannot exceed is a risk you have sized — and only the second reads as a commitment to a seller.
Nobody else is bidding 4.50% in year one, and that is exactly why it has to be contracted rather than hoped for. The EP is not matching a market price; it is creating the first one.
The bid does not move — what moves is how often it gets hit. As the venue matures somebody bids 4.25% and takes the trade. The EP’s quote stays posted and simply stops being filled. That is the taper, and it happens without renegotiation, without a schedule, and without anyone having to agree the market has matured. The obligation retires by ceasing to be exercised.
4.50%, and leave it there. Model the taper by taking a smaller share, not by widening the bid.
What the rest of the listing must pay to clear. Early on this runs wide, because the property has no trading record and nobody is competing for it. Unlike Pool 1 there is no ceiling — the EP simply competes for it.
12–14% in year one, compressing about 100 bps a year as records season.
Both pool sliders are shares of the same listing, and they add up. Pool 1 at 35% plus Pool 2 at 55% is 90% of the listing. This slider cannot be pushed past what the cornerstone has left — raise Pool 1 and the ceiling here drops to meet it, so the two can never exceed 100%.
This is the single biggest lever on the blend, and it is the reason the cornerstone is survivable at all. It is also the lever that decides whether there is a venue. What the EP does not take is the float: it is what trades on the secondary, what the loan book in section 6 lends against, and what gives other holders a reason to care how the building performs.
55% in year one, alongside a 35% cornerstone — 90% in, 10% out. Then hand a point back every year. Then set it to zero once, to see what the cornerstone looks like alone.
Both pools run on property already on the platform exactly as they do at a fresh mint — the 4.50% bid is what lets a holder exit today, the wider side is what patient sellers will take.
The gap between this and the Pool 2 mint yield is the single most consequential assumption in the model, and it is not a constant. A fresh listing prices wide for two reasons: no payment record, and no price discovery. In year one neither has resolved for the float either — a partition minted three months ago has three months of record. Early on the two should sit within a few basis points of each other, and a holder trying to exit a thin book may have to price wider than a mint, not tighter.
It also matters far more later than it does early. In year one the float is a small slice of what the EP buys, so this slider barely moves the answer. On a mature platform it is the larger half of supply and it dominates the return — the same 300 bps swing that costs a few points of CoC in year one is worth twenty-plus points later.
equal to the Pool 2 mint yield in year one, widening 50–75 bps a year as the first cohorts season.
Set Share of the rest you buy to 0% and leave the cornerstone at 35%. The blend collapses to 4.50% against a 7% facility and the year goes deeply negative — in all three of the early years. A 4.50% asset funded at 7% is negative carry, full stop.
Put it back to 80% and the blend lifts to 9–10%, which is 200–320 bps of positive carry. That is the whole argument in two clicks: the cornerstone is not the business, it is what buys the right to Pool 2, and Pool 2 pays for both.
Then walk the slider up slowly and watch the tension. The blend improves the whole way, and the float left for everyone else falls the whole way. The EP’s best year and the venue’s best year are not at the same setting, and where you land between them is the most consequential decision on the page.
It is also the one number that should move most between year one and year five. In year one there is no other bid to crowd out — taking 90% is not greed, it is the cold-start problem, and somebody has to own the building. By year five, taking 90% means the EP has no secondary book to sell into and no borrowers to lend to, and it has quietly bought both sides of its own market. The cornerstone tapers because the concession compresses; the total take should taper because the venue needs a float. Two different clocks, same direction.
Partitions the EP already owns are collateral. Pledge them, draw against them, buy more, pledge those.
There are two lenders in this model and only one of them is the EP. In section 6 the EP is the lender, advancing against other holders’ partitions. Here it is the borrower. A loan against its own partitions on its own platform is a round trip — it pays itself, and it nets to nothing. But a round trip moves no money. The cash that buys the next tranche comes from the facility in section 1: an outside institution, lending against the same partitions, setting its own advance rate.
That is why the flywheel has a limit at all. The haircut belongs to the facility, not to the EP, and it is the only brake in the mechanism. It is also why a turn costs the facility rate rather than the DeFi rate — and why funding the same purchase from cash already held produces no multiplier whatsoever. Nothing is multiplied by moving your own money between pockets.
How much of the book is posted as collateral rather than held unencumbered.
60%. Keeping a meaningful unpledged tail is what lets the EP ride a bad quarter.
Advance rate is warehouse language, not mortgage language — the share of pledged collateral a facility lender will fund, the same borrowing-base percentage a repo book or an asset-based line runs on. It is deliberately not called LTV: there is no appraised value here, only partitions with an observed market price, which is the venue’s entire argument.
Pledge times advance is the whole engine: at 60% × 50% = 30%, the multiplier is 1.43x and it converges there no matter how many turns you run, because pledge × advance is always under one.
50%. Push it and watch the ladder table lengthen.
Buying power is not the same as supply. You cannot deploy into listings that do not exist, and in year one there are very few. But a property, once minted, is on the platform forever — so the float accumulates, and you can always buy from it. This section is the L curve, expressed as three numbers.
New listings arriving that year. This is the number that goes from 1 to 10 once the venue is credible — retail owners, commercial owners, and other family offices all list into the same book.
$200M → $1B → $2B → $4B on the doubling path.
Everything minted in prior years, cumulative, because nothing ever leaves. This is the compounding term in the whole model: it feeds the buyable float in this section and the lendable base in section 6.
the running sum: $0 → $200M → $1.2B → $3.2B.
What share of the accumulated float existing holders put up for sale in a given year. This is supply for the EP to buy — what the EP sells is section 5.
It behaves backwards from what you would expect, and the reason is worth understanding. Raise it and returns fall. Not because supply is bad, but because once the EP’s money is what runs out, more supply cannot make it buy more — it only changes what it buys. The mix shifts toward seasoned float, which by assumption prices tighter than a fresh mint, so the blended entry yield falls toward it and the gain per turn goes with it.
The proof is one click: set Same yield on seasoned float in section 2 equal to the Pool 2 mint yield, and this slider stops affecting the return entirely. Every bit of the decline was price mix, none of it was volume.
Which means new listings are not inherently more profitable than float. They are more profitable only to the extent they price wider, and that gap is a seasoning premium that has to be earned over time — it does not exist on day one. What is durable about a new listing is not its price, it is the access. The cornerstone is a contractual right to a share of every mint. On the float the EP has no such right and must compete for it in an open book. When supply is the scarce thing, a guaranteed allocation beats a right to bid.
15%, which is roughly normal-market residential turnover.
This readout, and its twin on the bottom bar, is the most useful thing on the page. It tells you which lever is worth pulling and which is wasted effort.
The good problem. More property is arriving than the EP can absorb, and some of it goes to somebody else. More facility, a higher advance rate, or a longer hold all convert directly into more property owned. This is what the steep part of the L looks like from the inside.
The listings are there and the money is there, but the book will not take back everything the EP buys. That is not a loss. What does not trade stays on the balance sheet earning the blend against the facility. The EP is a holder until the venue trades enough for it to be a dealer — and every year it holds, the float grows and the book with it.
Buying power has nowhere to go and raising leverage does nothing at all. The only levers that matter are onboarding more property and taking a larger share of each listing — which is the real early-stage bottleneck, and the reason the cornerstone is worth contracting for rather than hoping for.
The EP bought at the blended entry yield. It sells at whatever the seasoned book pays. Because price is the reciprocal of yield, every point the book trades tighter than the entry is a gain, and it compounds against the price rather than the yield — so a 9.2% blend into a 9.0% book is worth about 2% on the money, not 20 bps.
A thin book does not stop the EP buying. It stops it selling. Whatever the book will not absorb simply stays on the balance sheet earning carry. That is the single most important mechanic in the early years, and it is what makes the runway survivable.
The yield seasoned partitions change hands at on the secondary. This is the EP's exit price. Tighter is better for a seller.
a point or so inside the Pool 2 mint yield, tightening slowly.
The hold the EP wants. Turns per year is twelve divided by this. Short holds recycle capital and capture the spread more often; long holds give up turns and keep the carry. At the far right it reads hold it — that is the levered-holder strategy, and in the flat years it is usually the right answer.
long in years 1–2, then shorten it as book volume grows.
Everything that trades on the secondary in a year, all participants. This is the venue's depth, and it is what decides whether the EP gets to be a dealer or has to be a holder.
roughly a third of the accumulated float, once there is a float at all.
A share of the market’s trading, not a share of the EP’s own holdings — the two are easy to confuse and they are unrelated. 15% of a $357M book is $53.55M, and that is the most the EP can sell in a year no matter how much it owns. The readout spells the multiplication out beside the slider for exactly this reason.
A dealer who is most of the volume is not getting the posted price, which is why the number should be conservative. And it is an estimate, not a lever — the market decides how much of it the EP gets to be. What the EP controls is position size and hold period.
10–15%, and use it as a stress test rather than an optimiser. Raising it always improves the CoC, because the model caps sales without ever charging for price impact — so a high number here buys a market that will be there when you need it. If the year only works above 50%, that is a position you cannot exit, not a strategy.
Spread crossed plus fees, charged on everything that actually trades. It comes straight off the gain per turn, so it matters far more at a three-month hold than at a five-year one.
50 bps.
Any holder can pledge partitions across any number of buildings and draw a single blanket loan, repaid by intercepting their distribution before it reaches them. The properties themselves stay free and clear forever — the lien is at the holder level, not the asset level, which is what lets a borrower's partitions trade without unwinding anything.
The lendable base is the float the EP does not own. Which means this business and the inventory business compete for the same partitions, and this one only becomes real once other people hold a lot of property. It is the annuity at the end of the L, not the engine at the start.
The advance rate to third-party holders. What matters is this less the facility rate; the panel shows that spread in basis points and flags it in red if the EP is lending below its own cost of funds.
around 10%, or roughly 300 bps over the facility.
Origination charged on every loan. It is taken up front but recognised across an assumed five-year life, so 200 bps of fee shows up as about 40 bps a year of income.
200 bps.
How long the principal is out before it comes back — the balloon, or the call, whichever lands first. The loans are interest-only, so nothing amortises; this slider is not about principal at all.
It exists because the origination fee is one-time cash at closing while every other figure on the page is an annual rate. 200 bps received once, spread across three years, is 67 bps a year. That is the only job this control does, and it is the difference between a loan book that clears your cost of funds and one that does not.
A shorter life raises the annual yield, which looks backwards until you see why: the same fee is earned faster. It assumes you re-lend the capital and charge a new fee when it returns. If the money comes back and sits idle, the model overstates you — it has no concept of undeployed cash between loans.
3 years, matching a 36-month interest-only term. Push it to 10 and watch the book go under water.
Credit cost. It is low here for a structural reason, not an optimistic one: repayment is a distribution intercept, and a shortfall is cured by liquidating the borrower's partitions pro rata into a venue that is already trading them.
30 bps, and stress it to 150 for the credit committee.
Take-up. What share of everyone else's holdings belongs to someone who wants a loan against it.
30%.
How far each borrower draws against their pledged partitions — the mirror of the slider in section 3, with the EP on the other side of it. Take-up times advance times the float the EP does not own is the entire demand curve.
50%.
The two businesses compete for the same dollar, and until you put them on the same footing there is no way to tell which should get it. The crossover does that by asking what a marginal dollar earns in each.
A dollar into inventory is levered by the flywheel; a dollar lent is not. That asymmetry is the whole comparison. Both are funded by the same facility at the same rate, and section 7 charges that cost once on the whole drawn balance — which is exactly why the two can be compared before it, without double-counting anything.
| A marginal dollar into… | Earns |
|---|---|
| Inventory | multiplier × blend, less the facility rate on the borrowed part — plus the spread on the way out, but only if the book still has room to absorb it |
| The loan book | your rate, plus the fee at its annual rate, less expected losses |
The spread term is the part worth understanding. When the book is already absorbing everything it will take, anything more the EP buys it simply keeps — so the marginal inventory dollar earns carry only, and the crossover drops sharply. A saturated exit is what makes lending competitive. In a deep book the flywheel turns the whole position at a gain every year, the marginal inventory dollar earns a very large number, and no sane lending rate beats it. Both answers are correct; they describe different venues.
And when the listings run out, the comparison collapses entirely. A marginal inventory dollar earns nothing at all — it sits idle and still carries facility cost — so lending wins at any rate clearing the cost of funds. The panel says so directly rather than quoting a crossover that no longer means anything. If there is no borrower demand either, it says that too, and names the real lever: more property on the platform.
The lendable base is the float the EP does not own, so it grows every point the EP hands back. Meanwhile the blend compresses as the venue matures, which drags the inventory side of the comparison down. Both clocks run the same direction.
Somewhere out there is the year the crossover flips — the year the marginal dollar is worth more lent than held. That is the year the EP stops being a dealer and becomes a lender, and it is worth being able to point at it in a term sheet. Walk the years forward with the working set at the end of this manual and find it.
Three sources, three costs, one line. Read it top to bottom and you can see exactly which of the EP's three jobs is paying in any given year — and the mix is supposed to change as the platform matures.
| Line | What it is | Comes from |
|---|---|---|
| Carry on inventory held | Average inventory × blended entry yield | §2 and §5 |
| Spread captured on sale | What actually trades × gain per turn | §5 |
| Net from lending | Interest and fees, less expected losses | §6 |
| Facility interest | Drawn balance × facility rate | §1 |
| Unused commitment fee | Headroom after drawn and flywheel | §1 and §3 |
| Cost of flywheel borrowing | Flywheel balance × facility rate | §3 |
The three tiles beside it — from carry, from spread and from lending — are the tell for where the EP is on the curve, and they always add to 100. Carry-dominant is a holder in the flat years. Spread-dominant is a dealer in the steep ones. Lending-dominant is the annuity at the end, and it is the destination the whole structure is walking toward. The transition between them is the whole thesis, and you can watch it happen by moving one slider in section 5.
They are shares of gross income, not of the cash-on-cash return — the three financing costs come out after. A year can read 85% from carry and still return nothing, which is exactly what happens when the blend fails to clear the facility rate. The tiles say where the money came from; the CoC says whether there was any left.
This is the honest section, and it is the one a serious partner will turn to first. Success is not free: as listings season and buyers compete for new supply, Pool 2 no longer has to price wide to clear. It tightens toward the book, the blend falls with it, and the gain per turn goes too.
The lever the EP holds is Pool 1 — accept a higher yield on the cornerstone slice, and the blend comes back up. That is exactly what a maturing market allows, because the listing needs less help to clear. When the Pool 1 yield you would need reaches Pool 2 itself, the subsidy is gone and so is the role.
The concession is the premium a fresh listing pays over the seasoned book — new-issue language, the same discount a bond accepts to get placed. Pool 2 buys the mint at one yield while the book trades tighter, and that gap is the EP's margin. This is how many basis points of it close each year.
Higher is the platform succeeding faster. The seasoned float converges on the same schedule, and neither can tighten past the book — the float, starting closer, floors there first.
60 bps a year as a base case, then push it to 150 and find the year it breaks.
Maintain, not hold. This has nothing to do with the hold period in section 5, or with what the book forces the EP to keep. It is a hurdle: the gain per turn the EP intends to go on hitting.
Section 5 runs forward — your settings produce a gain per turn, as an output. This runs backwards — you state the gain you require, and the table solves for the Pool 1 yield that would still deliver it as the concession closes, marking the year the answer stops existing. Section 5 says what you earn; section 8 says what you would have to accept to keep earning it. Neither is about volume.
4%.
This table prices a listing exactly the way section 2 does — the same four buckets at the same weights — and takes the cost per sale out of the gain exactly the way section 5 does. So the first row reconciles with the rest of the page, and the compression walks forward from a number you can check.
The table splits into two halves. Gain per turn and Carry vs facility are the do-nothing path — what happens at the cornerstone you have today, if you never act. Pool 1 needed and Blended entry are the if-you-act path: the yield that would hold your hurdle, and the blend it would buy you. In a year needing no change that blend equals section 2 exactly; in a year that does, it sits on the hurdle instead.
Not maintaining the hurdle is a decision, not a failure. The gain per turn decays and eventually goes negative — but a negative gain per turn means you should stop selling, not that you should stop owning. The carry is still there. Section 5 says the same thing in a different voice: the carry is not the problem, the turning is. You stop being a dealer and become the levered holder and lender you always said you would become.
The other date is the one that actually ends things.
The Pool 1 yield you would need has reached Pool 2 itself. There is no concession left to give back and the gain per turn cannot be restored. Survivable — you are a levered holder earning the market yield, with a loan book against a float that by then is very large.
The blend no longer clears the facility rate, so you are paying to own property. Not a change of business — the end of one. The row greys out, and this status outranks everything else on the line, because nothing above it matters once it fires.
The under-water date is set by the cost of funds, not by the cornerstone. Raising Pool 1 cannot fix it: the concession has already gone, and the cornerstone slice is a drag on the blend, not a source of it.
Try it. At a 7% facility the blend still clears by 53 bps in year seven — thin, but alive the whole way. Move the facility rate to 9% and the same platform, with identical listings and identical compression, goes under water in year three. Nothing else changed. That is how much of this structure rests on one number, and it is the number an EP brings to the table.
The year the table flags subsidy exhausted is the most important date in the term sheet. It is not a failure — it is the platform having succeeded, and it is the reason to write the commitment with a defined life rather than leave it open. After that date the EP is a long-term holder earning the market yield with leverage, plus a loan book against a float that by then is very large. That is the business you are actually partnering to build; the dealer years are how you get paid to build it.
| Figure | What it answers | Colour turns |
|---|---|---|
| Cash-on-cash | Return on the EP's own money this year | green 12%+, amber 6–12%, red below |
| Blended entry | Cost basis and carry, against the book | — |
| Gain per turn | Percentage on the money, per sale | green 2%+, amber positive, red negative |
| Deployed / yr | Purchases, and the turns behind them | — |
| Total leverage | Facility plus flywheel, over own capital | green to 3x, amber to 6x, red above |
| Runs out first | Which constraint is binding right now | the three states in §4 |
The six money figures — own capital, facility drawn, facility size, minted per year, already on the platform, book volume — are drop-downs, not sliders. Pick from the list; the slider beside each one is only there for sweeping between values.
Work in this order, because each step feeds the next:
| Year | Minted | On platform | Book vol | Own capital | Drawn | Line | Position | Blend | CoC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | $200M | $0 | $200M | $50M | $75M | $150M | $179M | 10.18% | 13.9% |
| 2 | $1.0B | $200M | $400M | $250M | $500M | $1.0B | $1.07B | 9.55% | 12.2% |
| 3 | $2.0B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $750M | $1.5B | $3.0B | $3.21B | 8.91% | 9.3% |
Cornerstone 35% at 4.50%, Pool 2 at 80%, 100% to inventory, hold it, 7% facility, 37.5 bps commitment fee. Position is cumulative, because the EP is holding. All three years read Your money runs out — there is more property than capital, which is the problem you want.
Listings are an input, not an output. The tool does not yet credit the cornerstone commitment for creating the deal flow it then buys — so the 35% reads as pure cost when in practice it is the reason the listings show up at all. Wiring that link would make the early years look better than they do here, not worse. Until then, treat the flat part of the L as conservatively stated.